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The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2012 decision to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 has sparked an intense domestic policy debate over health 
care reform, including the forthcoming expansion of health care 
coverage to millions of Americans. Despite partisan gridlock at the 
national policy level, opportunities exist within the current health 
care system to coordinate resources, slow the rise of public health 
care expenditures, and expand access to care.  "is paper explores 
one such opportunity by introducing a simple game-theoretic 
model of patient interaction to show how the constraints on a net-
work structure of health care provider organizations and the flow 
of information between providers and patients within that network 
generated a socially suboptimal level of care in Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio, in 2008. Specifically, the paper will focus on the evolving so-
cial-affiliation network of both health care provider organizations 
and the indigent and uninsured patient populations within a three-
city interest area of Cuyahoga County. "e primary challenge for 
charity care in Cuyahoga County is shown to be structural (in 
the network-theoretic sense), revealing an insidious geographical 
paradox: despite the spatial proximity of several viable charity care 
providers, many patients over-rely on select health care organiza-
tions and underuse other available resources. Ultimately, the model 
illustrates how local government-initiated coordination among 
health care providers and geographical expansion of the health care 
providers available to patients should remedy the socially subopti-
mal uncompensated care consumption problem and promote the 
attainment of a socially optimal consumption level.
"is analysis will lead to a discussion of coordination among 
health care providers and the role of local government as drivers 
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of improved care and reduced costs. While both federal and state 
government agencies currently subsidize uncompensated care, 
county governments and local policymakers have clear opportuni-
ties to have a tangible and proactive influence on the issue of rising 
health care costs. Health care expenditures in the United States 
now consume roughly 17 percent of the country’s entire economic 
output and appear to be rising at an unsustainable rate.1 It is the lo-
cal government, however, that has the capacity to directly foster co-
ordination among health care providers, lower system-wide health 
care costs, and improve health care access and quality, all from the 
bottom up. Although local government does not have the direct 
financial incentives that federal and state governments have to re-
duce public health care expenditures, all of society stands to benefit 
from increased coordination among providers, more optimal care 
consumption by patients, and lower costs.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY IN 2008: UNINSURED PATIENTS 
AND THE DISJOINTED HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
"e latest assessment by the Ohio Department of Health re-
ports that roughly 33 percent of Cuyahoga County’s nearly 1.3 mil-
lion residents live at or below 200 percent of the Federal Poverty 
Line (FPL).2 While the same report notes that nearly 18 percent 
of the county’s population is uninsured, 2007 Census Bureau data 
shows that at least fifty thousand people living in the county are 
both uninsured and living at or below 200 percent of the FPL.3  
At first glance, one might presume that the uninsured popu-
lation living at or below 200 percent of the FPL (hereafter “unin-
sured population”) was unimpeded in its search for quality, low-cost 
health care options. Indeed, the Greater Cleveland area is home 
to one of the most acclaimed and comprehensive health care sys-
tems in the United States, including top-ranked organizations like 
the University Hospitals Case Medical Center and the Cleveland 
Clinic Health System.4 Like their counterparts in many regional 
health care systems, these hospitals provide uncompensated care, 
colloquially referred to as “charity care.” Although they administer 
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care either for free or at significantly reduced prices for qualified 
low-income patients, the hospitals are only partially reimbursed by 
government funds.5
"e provision of charity care in Greater Cleveland is limited 
by the same factors that restrict providers across the United States. 
First, not all health care providers have the same financial capac-
ity to take on charity cases, and upper limits to the provision, and 
subsequent consumption, of charity care exist.6 Second, the lack 
of meaningful coordination among the health care providers pro-
motes duplicate and overlapping patient visits, unnecessary billing, 
needless coverage by the hospitals, systematic inefficiency, higher 
medical outlays, and lower quality of care.7 As a result of this lack 
of coordination, many uninsured patients forego primary and pre-
ventive care and instead resort to Emergency Department visits 
(ED care) whenever they believe they require medical attention.  
"is poses a significant cost challenge to hospitals that pro-
vide charity care to the uninsured and indigent. When these pa-
tients seek ED care, they often require expensive treatments for 
serious ailments that may be preventable through regular visits to 
primary care practitioners, or they require medical attention for 
non-urgent, low acuity problems.8 In Cuyahoga County, the Me-
troHealth Medical Center, a public safety-net hospital, assumes 
much of this charity ED care burden. According to county govern-
ment estimates, 74,480 of 98,000 MetroHealth emergency depart-
ment visits were either uninsured or Medicaid covered patients.9 
MetroHealth was the hospital of choice for “frequent flyer” unin-
sured patients (those that visited an emergency room at least five 
times) in 2008.10
Despite its ostensible might, the Greater Cleveland health 
care community faced a serious dilemma in 2008: what could be 
done to reduce the charity ED care burden at certain provider sites 
while also promoting higher quality care for the region’s uninsured 
and indigent demographic? As Cuyahoga County government ad-
ministrators would realize, and as this paper illustrates, other types 
of providers (such as smaller primary care clinics) existed in the 
greater health care system. However, the uninsured population sig-
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nificantly underused these non-hospital health care providers. 
CONSTRUCTING THE SOCIAL-AFFILIATION NETWORK 
OF PROVIDERS AND UNINSURED PATIENTS
Network theory offers a compelling method for illustrating 
charity care consumption in this paper’s three-city interest area in 
2008. In constructing this particular network structure, I consid-
ered the three cities—Lakewood, Cleveland, and East Cleveland—
in terms of the uninsured patients, the major hospitals, and the 
smaller primary care clinics found within them. Not only do Cleve-
land, Lakewood, and East Cleveland contain high concentrations 
of the county’s uninsured and indigent patients, but the cities also 
cover much of Cuyahoga County’s physical territory.11 
Figure 1 depicts the building blocks of the social-affiliation 
network of this system.
 
In both Triad A and Triad B, a single circular node depicts 
112 +SPHWXIMR3TXMQM^MRK,IEPXL'EVI2IX[SVOW
a social node, defined as a particular community of uninsured pa-
tients.  "e social node in Triad A represents a portion of the un-
insured demographic residing in Cleveland’s West Side districts, 
west of the Public Square, the main plaza of Cleveland’s central 
business district. "e social node in Triad B illustrates a portion of 
the uninsured population living in Cleveland’s East Side districts, 
east of the Public Square. Each triad also contains two diamond-
shaped focal nodes. As defined by Scott Feld, focal nodes repre-
sent points around which people interact, or more specifically, any 
“social, psychological, legal, or physical entity around which joint 
activities are organized.”12 In our three-city interest area, each fo-
cal node represents a health care providing organization to which 
the social node is connected. Given MetroHealth’s high charity ED 
care caseload, the MetroHealth focal node attracts a significantly 
high number of uninsured patients from both social nodes—East 
and West. MetroHealth is widely known as the public safety-net 
hospital throughout the Greater Cleveland area, and as such, both 
social nodes are connected to the MetroHealth focal node with 
strong ties, indicated by a solid line.13 Despite spatial proximity, 
the smaller primary care clinic is both less known and less used 
by the social node in each triad. "us, a weak tie, illustrated by a 
dashed line, connects each social node to its respective primary care 
provider organization.14
Figure 2 illustrates the social-affiliation network structure of 
these communities and health care providers in 2008 (at t = 1), 
which is constructed by joining the two triads. Here, both social 
nodes are connected to the MetroHealth focal node. By the Strong 
Triadic Closure Property:
We say that a node A violates the Strong Triadic Closure 
Property if it has strong ties to two other nodes B and C, and there 
is no edge at all (either a strong or weak tie) between B and C. We 
say that node A satisfies the Strong Triadic Closure Property if it 
does not violate it.15
"us, as a result of the shared knowledge of and attraction 
to the MetroHealth ED throughout the Greater Cleveland area, a 
strong tie is illustrated to close the gap between the two social nods.
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Figure 2
 
Figure 2 offers a telling illustration of the charity care sys-
tem’s egregious structural problem in 2008. Although prospective 
patients live in close spatial proximity to several health care pro-
vider options, the patients are not equally connected to each nearby 
care-providing organization. Unseen on a standard map of the 
area, this network depicts “structural holes” that exist between dis-
parate clusters of nodes within the network.16 As MetroHealth is 
strongly connected to the two social communities, it forms a com-
plete clique.17 Northcoast Health Ministry and NEON Hough 
Medical Center are not in complete cliques; in fact, each of these 
smaller primary care organizations is only weakly tied to one other 
social node in the network.
"e presence of these structural holes highlights the negative 
aspect of the social-affiliation network’s structure at t = 1: viable 
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health care centers, which happen to be spatially proximal to pro-
spective patients, are underused relative to the services rendered at 
the MetroHealth ED. "e holes also represent a potential source of 
optimism, however. As Ronald Burt asserts, structural holes offer 
a “competitive advantage for . . . individual[s] whose relationships 
span the holes,” as well as “opportunities [for these individuals] to 
broker the flow of information between [nodes].”18 
A SIMPLE GAME-THEORETIC CONSIDERATION OF 
SOCIALLY SUB-OPTIMAL CHARITY CARE CONSUMPTION 
IN 2008
Assuming the above structure accurately models the social-
affiliation network of health care providers in the three-city in-
terest area, we can formally illustrate how uninsured patients in 
the region consumed charity care in 2008. In order to depict this 
behavior in a clear and concise manner, I will establish further as-
sumptions on which to build a simple game-theoretic model. With 
these set assumptions, a system of first-order differential equations 
can be established to illustrate patient actions within the game, as 
well as Nash equilibrium levels of charity care consumption at-
tained through patient action at each stage of the game.
First, let charity care be considered a common-pool resource–
a good that is both non-excludable and beneficial to those who 
qualify for it, but is limited in its quantity.19 "e government often 
subsidizes charity care, yet there are limits to the quantity of char-
ity care that can be subsidized. Consequently, the stock of charity 
care at any given hospital in the network is fixed at a certain up-
per bound. Despite this constraint, the provision of charity care to 
those who qualify, such as the uninsured population living at less 
than 200 percent of the FPL in our three-city interest area, is non-
excludable by any particular health care provider.
Next, let the qualifying uninsured patients in our three-city 
interest area act as rational agents in their consumption of charity 
care. "at is, when deciding to choose a health care provider, such 
as MetroHealth in Cleveland or Northcoast Health Ministry in 
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Lakewood, these patients have complete and transitive preferences. 
"ey understand with certainty what they prefer, and for any A, 
B, and C, if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is 
preferred to C. "e patients also prefer to have more of something 
they like and their preferences experience diminishing marginal re-
turns.20
Finally, assume that each uninsured patient seeking charity 
care in our three-city interest area has the same information about 
available charity care options. Also assume that whenever medical 
care is deemed necessary, the patient strategically seeks to exploit 
the common-pool resource as best as possible with the belief that 
every other patient will be acting in the same manner. 
With these assumptions defined, we can begin to explain how 
individuals possibly acted within this setting in pursuit of charity 
care in 2008. More specifically, I implement a mathematical opti-
mization model similar to those envisioned by Gordon (1954) and 
by Brander and Taylor (1997) in their considerations of collective 
action and the consumption of common-pool resources.21
Geography plays a central role in this social affiliation net-
work. "e network contains two social nodes, or communities of 
people. One is situated on the West Side of Cleveland; the other 
is located on the East Side. As depicted in both triads shown in 
Figure 1, each social cluster can choose between two health care 
providers for its care: either MetroHealth, the largest hospital pro-
vider of charity care in the area, or a small local primary care clinic. 
"is decision can be illustrated at the level of the individual 
within each triad. For the purpose of illustrating this phenomenon 
in a simple manner, assume a situation in which there are 30 indi-
viduals in need of charity care in either triad. Formally, each pro-
spective patient has two options. He or she can go to MetroHealth 
and realize a positive utility at the hospital, H(Ʌ), modeled by the 
function:
          MetroHealth ! H(!) = 20 "           
!
2
where Ʌ represents the number of  other prospective patients 
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who concurrently seek care from MetroHealth. Alternatively, the 
patient can visit a small local primary care clinic and realize a cur-
rently constant positive utility at the clinic, C(Ʌ), modeled by the 
function:
          Small clinic ! C(!) = 10          
Given the volume of public information about MetroHealth’s 
role as a public safety-net hospital, and considering the strong ties 
connecting the hospital to the network’s social nodes, MetroHealth 
attracts a higher frequency of prospective patients in the uncoordi-
nated health care network at t = 1, as confirmed by the empirical 
data on MetroHealth’s charity ED care caseload burden in 2008. 
As a result, although patients can initially experience a higher indi-
vidual positive utility at low levels of Ʌ, prospective patients realize 
increasing disutility proportionate to Ʌ, due to congestion, limited 
resources, and increased wait times at the ED, all of which intensify 
as Ʌ increases. "ough under-promoted in the network at t = 1, 
the small primary care clinic offers an initially smaller individual 
amount of positive utility to the prospective patient, without the 
disutility component that comes with congestion and over-compe-
tition for care.
Following the above assumptions about the individuals and 
their strategic behavior in this game situation, a Nash equilibrium 
is reached when each of the thirty prospective patients strategically 
seeks out charity care at either location in a manner that is per-
ceived to be a best response to other patients doing the same. In 
such equilibrium, there is no perceived incentive for any patient to 
switch from one health care provider to the other.22 "us:
                    Nash equilibrium ! H(!)
!"




At this equilibrium state, twenty of the thirty prospective 
patients seek care at MetroHealth, while just ten seek care at the 
smaller primary care clinic. As there is no incentive to switch be-
tween providers, each patient realizes a standard individual utility 
of Ui = 10, where:
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                    H(20)
C(10)




 "e total utility is signified by:




Does this equilibrium illustrate a socially optimal consump-
tion of charity care in our three-city interest area in 2008? "e 
structure of the social-affiliation network suggests that it does not. 
Lack of coordination among charity care providers creates a net-
work in which small primary care clinics are less known and unde-
rutilized compared with hospitals like MetroHealth. "e effects of 
this lack of coordination are formally illustrated when we derive the 
socially optimal level of charity care consumption from our model. 
By optimizing total socially optimal utility with respect to Ʌ:
                    
Total (!) = !(20 ! ) + 10(30 ! !)US.O. !2





                    = 10!!S.O.
With respect to Ʌ*S.O.,
                    Total  ( ) = 10 ! 15 + 20 ! 10 = 350 > [300| ]US.O. !!S.O. !
!
Indeed, as of 2008, the social-affiliation network of health 
care providers in the three-city interest area promoted a socially 
sub-optimal level of charity care consumption. "at being said, 
within the network structure at t = 1, as depicted in this model, the 
prospective patients do not have an incentive to act in a way that 
would reach the socially optimal level of charity care consumption. 
Moreover, the formal calculation of total socially optimal utility 
suggests that in order to reach TUS.O., prospective patients would 
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need to randomly choose to seek charity care at particular primary 
care providers, be actively directed to them, or be significantly em-
powered and incentivized to seek them out.
CHAP: COORDINATION AMONG CHARITY CARE 
PROVIDERS, “EXPANDED” GEOGRAPHY, AND SOCIALLY 
OPTIMAL CHARITY CARE CONSUMPTION
In 2009, the Greater Cleveland health care community, led by 
health policy officials within the local Cuyahoga County govern-
ment, formed a coordinated coalition in order to increase the use of 
smaller primary care providers and promote preventive medicine in 
the county. "is organization, the Cuyahoga Health Access Part-
nership (CHAP) is a public-private collaboration of fifteen orga-
nizations in the Greater Cleveland health care area. CHAP offers 
a coordinated system of health care access for Cuyahoga County’s 
low-income, uninsured adults (ages 18-64), and was founded on 
the principle that its members have a shared responsibility to ad-
dress the uninsured crisis in Cuyahoga County and to provide a 
coherent system of access for the uninsured adults in question. De-
spite its primary care focus, CHAP addresses the entire spectrum 
of care. One of the principal goals of the organization is to sig-
nificantly reduce visits to area hospitals’ emergency departments, 
which have proven to be, on average, both unnecessarily frequent 
and costly.23
 Crucially, CHAP officially coordinates charity care provision 
among the various hospitals and small primary care clinics in the 
network. "rough a shared and standardized patient eligibility and 
enrollment system, CHAP helps to optimally distribute the char-
ity care caseload among the county’s various providers. To accom-
plish this goal, CHAP performs community outreach to its target 
population and disseminates information about the availability and 
value of care provided by the small primary care clinics.
Although CHAP is a new organization, and there is no em-
pirical data on its effectiveness, CHAP has profound theoreti-
cal implications for the model depicted in the previous section. 
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Whereas prospective patients previously had no incentive to act in 
a manner that yielded a socially optimal level of charity care con-
sumption, under CHAP, patients can be directly referred to care 
providers. "is new coordination in the social-affiliation network 
suggests that updated calculations of the total utility in the system 
could begin to approach TUS.O..
CHAP AND CHANGES IN THE NETWORK STRUCTURE
CHAP’s formation indicates an expansion of the informa-
tional geography of providers in the social-affiliation network. Fig-
ure 3 shows the network at t = 2, immediately following CHAP’s 
official establishment. At this time, systematic coordination is 
formed between the health care providers in the network. "is 
is depicted by the emergence of a strong tie path that connects 
Northcoast Health Ministry, MetroHealth, and NEON Hough 
Medical Center. At t = 2, there are no other changes to the network 
structure.
Figure 2
After some time, however, these newly formed strong ties 
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should spur further change in the network structure. As Figure 4 
illustrates, at t = 2, the Strong Triadic Closure Property pressures a 
conversion of the weak ties that initially connected each social node 
to its respective primary care clinic at t = 2.  
Figure 4
Strong ties replace both weak ties and the social-affiliation 
network is complete. Just as the simple game-theoretic model con-
structed in the previous section illustrates how the social-affiliation 
network structure at t = 1 leads to a socially sub-optimal consump-
tion of charity care, the post-CHAP network illustrates how op-
timal consumption may be feasible in the three-city interest area. 
Notice that Figure 4 depicts a network that now contains one com-
plete clique. "e structural holes depicted in the pre-CHAP net-
work have been closed. At t = 3, the newly coordinated health care 
system can be thought of as one focal node rich in resources and in-
formation. In this sense, the coordinated health care node is struc-
turally central. It lies on the shortest path between the two social 
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nodes and it represents a single point” that can control the commu-
nication flow within the network.24 "e new flow of information 
may entice patients to utilize the formerly underused primary care 
clinics within the system; similarly, it can repel them from the pre-
viously overused and congested hospital emergency departments. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
"e simple game-theoretic explanation of patient consump-
tion of charity care in the three-city interest area offers some expla-
nation for the changing social-affiliation network illustrated above. 
On the surface, the model concisely illustrates how the coordina-
tion of various types of health care providers in the region may lead 
to more optimal levels of charity consumption, thereby ameliorat-
ing a lingering social ill. But what is the underlying force that allows 
this change to transpire? A local spatial element is certainly central. 
Intuitively, an expanded geography of available health care 
providers should promote a more efficient and socially optimal 
provision of care. Researchers have found evidence of a “supplier 
induced demand” for health care, wherein there is a direct posi-
tive spatial relationship between an area’s access to health care 
and its social utilization of it.25 "is may be true when compar-
ing urban Greater Cleveland with rural Appalachian Ohio, an area 
with far lower health care capital. However, this spatial relation-
ship appears to fail to explain the intra-community inefficiencies 
in the consumption of care. If this relationship holds true in all 
cases, prospective patients would logically disperse their charity 
care consumption more universally among the Cuyahoga County 
health care providers, rather than rely heavily on hospital-based 
emergency departments.
"eoretical models and subsequent simulations have been 
conducted to predict the spatial interaction patterns of health care 
access in lower income areas. A core assumption in such models, 
however, has been that primary care providers–the general first 
point of entry into the health care system–are primarily accessed in 
times of medical necessity.26 Yet, as shown in this paper, the behav-
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ior of the uninsured population of Cuyahoga County contradicts 
this ostensibly sound assumption. Despite the presence of accessi-
ble primary care clinics, a significant segment of uninsured patients 
seeks care at hospital-based emergency departments. "e situation 
in Cuyahoga County exhibits the presence of this geographical par-
adox. Although the same physical network of health care facilities 
is present in 2011 as in 2008, they were uncoordinated in 2008 and 
consumers were unaware of how to optimally use them.
Given the sub-optimal use of primary care resources dis-
cussed in this paper, perhaps it is not surprising that Litaker, Ko-
roukian, and Love (2005) found that “Individuals living in counties 
in which primary care physicians comprised a larger proportion of 
practicing physicians were also somewhat less likely to report hav-
ing no usual source of care.”27 It is plausible to conclude that there 
was a geographical paradox in the consumption of preventive, pri-
mary, and charity care in Cuyahoga County in 2008. As supported 
by both the empirical results and theoretical considerations, mere 
spatial proximity to sources of primary care is not the sole deter-
minant for where an individual seeks care. Nor is spatial proximity 
the solution to the problem of socially sub-optimal consumption 
of charity care in a given area, although it should be considered. 
Outreach policies must be actively pursued toward the county’s 
uninsured and indigent social communities. Only then will infor-
mation flow effectively through the social-affiliation network and 
empower individuals to make optimal health care consumption 
choices. Proximity alone cannot connect uninsured patients to fa-
vorable care-providing sites; information must be the driver of sys-
tematic connection.
But who has the power and resources to augment the infor-
mation flow within the health care network? As asserted in the in-
troduction, this is a local problem. Due to the halt in U.S. national 
health care policy debate, local government appears to be the most 
viable mechanism for enacting expeditious policy change. Indeed, 
county and municipal governments are responsible for upholding 
the rights and welfare of their citizens through the administration 
of public resources. Local governments have an inherent interest 
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in fostering coordination between health care leaders that operate 
within their limits, for such action stands to benefit both the health 
of their citizens (through increased care quality) and the sound-
ness of their health care corporations (through decreased costs). 
"ough the powers of county and municipal governments are infe-
rior to those of the states, most local governments, including those 
of Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland, can directly in-
fluence this issue through control of the city’s emergency medical 
services, local income taxes on health care professionals, and zoning 
ordinances that can affect the expansion of the region’s health care 
organizations.28
"ough CHAP has only recently been fully implemented, the 
operation represents a promising example of system-wide health 
care coordination begotten by a single county government agency. 
While the success of CHAP is uncertain, time will no doubt yield 
important information about the effectiveness of locally initiated 
resource coordination projects far before substantive health care 
policy reform is enacted and evaluated at the federal level. 
"e trends illustrated in this paper intimate deep-running is-
sues concerning access to care and the sub-optimal consumption 
of charity care across the nation. Most highly populated regions 
throughout the United States have not begun to explore locally ini-
tiated care-access collaborative projects. As Medicaid expansion is 
implemented under the Affordable Care Act, the entire nation will 
need to consider creative solutions for lower costs and improved 
care access. 
"is paper employs network structure to highlight one pos-
sible explanation for the seemingly unlikely sub-optimal charity 
care consumption within a particular health care arena. However, 
the models laid out in this paper are limited by their underlying 
assumptions and overall generality. In-depth structural analyses of 
health care systems are needed to determine actual structural holes 
within health systems, which in turn may be used to ascertain how 
to better coordinate existing resources, interact with patients, and 
optimally provide care.  Moreover, patient experience response sur-
veys should be developed to accurately pinpoint patient behaviors 
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as they interact with other patients in competition for charity care 
resources. "is paper lays the theoretical groundwork for further 
data-driven research.
To view all charts and tables, visit:
http://www.helvidius.org/2012/goldstein
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